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Evaluating the viability of obtaining DNA profiles from DNA encapsulated between the layers of composite counterfeit banknotes





Banknote counterfeiting can potentially undermine the integrity of a currency, by eroding both public and retailer confidence in cash as a method of payment. To thwart such criminal counterfeiting activity, banknote issuing authorities employ a range of overt and covert technologies, most in the form of banknote security features.
The development, selection and deployment of such features, is an ongoing process undertaken jointly between the manufacturers of security features, banknote printers and banknote issuing authorities, i.e. Central Banks. This ongoing process helps maintain the integrity of banknotes as a recognised, safe and secure means of payment. While some counterfeit banknotes are seized by police at the point of production or whilst in storage, others are removed from circulation during banknote sorting operations, as part of the ‘cash cycle’. Counterfeit banknotes which are removed from circulation are inevitably contaminated, in terms of finger marks and DNA acquired during handling by both criminals and non-criminals alike. However, encapsulated DNA recovered from between the layers of a composite banknote, is highly likely to belong to a person involved in the manufacturing process and is therefore of far greater evidential value. Such evidence has the potential to identify the criminals involved in counterfeit note production.










Manufacturing and circulating counterfeit currencies are a major area of criminal activity.  Investigating such crimes can be an arduous task given the sheer volume of counterfeits that are taken out of circulation. Counterfeit currencies can be of such poor quality that it does not pose any true threat to a country’s economy given it can easily be identified and removed from circulation. That said, organised crime outlets [1] producing large quantities of high-quality fake notes can pose a significant economic threat and cause mistrust in a currency to arise [2]. The variations which exist in counterfeits can make linking counterfeit banknotes by reference to their physical characteristics alone an arduous task. Given this, an ability to obtain DNA profile from the counterfeiters themselves would be advantageous to the police and prosecuting authorities. To establish an appropriate extraction technique, three different methods were evaluated: Chelex resin extraction, Phenol-Chloroform extraction, and a Direct PCR method.

2.0 Materials and Methods

2.1 Sample preparation
A set of 5 serial dilutions from a 590 pg/μl pre-quantified extracted DNA stock were prepared to simulate the concentrations at which trace DNA is likely to be deposited [3]. Each dilution was carried out in triplicate for each DNA acquisition technique. Of each dilution, 2 μl was placed onto the adhesive side of a hologram before being placed onto a paper substrate. In total, 45 control samples were produced with known DNA content, 15 for each DNA acquisition process, excluding the negative controls. A set of 9 adhesive holograms that had been manually placed onto a paper substrate by a volunteer were also prepared. Alongside these simulated counterfeits, seized counterfeit banknotes were included in the initial analysis. All separation tools, including the un-assembled banknote components were sterilised using UV light and ethanol. After leaving the hologram to adhere to the paper substrate, holograms were manually lifted off the note paper using a scalpel and tweezers. The adhesive side and the surface area to which the hologram was adhered to were then swabbed using sterile cotton swabs with DNA free water.
2.2 DNA Extraction
Samples were extracted either using Chelex Resin (Bio-Rad, UK) as per manufacturer’s instructions and Phenol-Chloroform (Sigma Life Sciences, UK) as per the protocol described by Green and Sambrook [5]. For the Direct PCR samples, these were cut into 6 equal segments and directly introduced into each PCR well.
2.3 Quantification PCR





Fig 1. shows the concentration of DNA that was acquired on average from the Chelex extraction technique and the Phenol-Chloroform extraction technique alongside the STR loci used to quantify the concentration. The legend indicates the concentration of DNA placed on the adhesive side of the hologram before swabbing.

Overall, the Chelex based extraction technique was found consistently achieved the highest yield in extracting detectable levels of DNA. The Phenol-Chloroform extractions did produce some detectable DNA, but most samples did not reach above 5 picograms of DNA, especially when using the TH01 based qPCR. 
To establish the significance of the results, a Kruskal-Wallis test was carried out on the separate extraction methods and the STR loci used. The comparison of Chelex extraction and Phenol-Chloroform extraction for both loci gave probability values of >0.05 for both sets of STR loci at 0.843 for TH01 and 0.443 for SE33.
Not included in figure 1, are the detected DNA concentrations found on the volunteer hologram and the counterfeit banknotes. As there was no way to ascertain how much DNA may have been placed on the hologram, the samples could not be compared to the potential deposited DNA. All the volunteer and counterfeit banknotes gave readings of less than 100 picograms of DNA except for one of the volunteer samples that contained 112 picograms when measured using the TH01 STR loci.

4.0 Discussion
Although there may be only slight differences in the results obtained, the data would suggest that using Chelex resin after swabbing the adhesive side of a counterfeit hologram is the most successful technique in DNA extraction. However, there was no statistically significant difference found between the two extractions. The acquired DNA may not be adequate to produce a DNA profile for the prepared samples, but this must be contrasted by the findings using the volunteer samples. In these there was a sample providing in excess of 100 picograms of DNA. None of the counterfeit banknotes processed gave any results above 100 picograms, but there was DNA detected in each sample. The low concentration of DNA detected in the counterfeit banknote holograms may be due to age of the counterfeit items. All the counterfeit banknotes were over 12 months old. In comparison, the volunteer samples and pre-prepared samples were swabbed and extracted within a week of any DNA deposition. The removal of the holograms may also of hindered the swabbing of any DNA present. In the counterfeit banknotes, some adhesive was fused into the paper substrate, meaning a sterile scalpel had to be used to remove the adhesive. The next stage of the research will look to examine various types of swabs with other swabbing agents. On establishing a successful DNA acquisition technique, STR profiling will be attempted on the extracted DNA within the adhesive holograms. Further research will be conducted to establish if there is the potential risk of any such DNA located being contaminated by innocent individuals during the item’s circulation, or if all such DNA collected could only be deposited during an item’s manufacture. Concurrent with this, additional examination will look at the possibility of separating the paper layers of counterfeit banknotes, looking to acquire DNA from the embedded security thread placed to simulate real banknotes.

5.0 Conclusion
The research conducted thus far suggests there is potential to uncover a counterfeiter’s identity through DNA deposited during use of their illegal products and processes. 
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